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WHO REALLY SHOULD HAVE EXERCISED
JURISDICTION OVER THE MILITARY PILOTS
IMPLICATED IN TIE 1998 ITALY GONDOLA ACCIDENT?
KIMBERLY C. PRIEST-HAMILTON*
INTRODUCTION
O N FEBRUARY 3, 1998, a U.S. Marine Corps EA-6B Prowler
flew up the Val di Fiemme toward Cavalese on a low-level
training mission from the nearby Aviano Air Base.1 As a result
of flying well below altitude restrictions, the jet severed the
cables supporting an Italian ski gondola.2 Tragically, all twenty
passengers of the gondola dropped approximately 400 feet to
their death.3
Prosecutors alleged that Captain Richard Ashby, the pilot of
the Prowler, and Captain Joseph Schweitzer, the navigator ("the
crew-members"), were flying too low and too fast at the time of
the accident, possibly showing off or "flat-lining. '4 Further-
more, Italy's Air Force Chief General Mario Aspino declared
that the Prowler was flying 3300 feet below the designated alti-
tude floor (specified in the flight plan that was filed at Aviano)
and four miles off course.5 While U.S. Ambassador Thomas
Foglietta recently conceded that the Prowler clearly was "flying
* Kimberly C. Priest-Hamilton graduated with honors from Southern Method-
ist University School of Law in May of 2000. After serving one year as law clerk to
the Honorable Barbara M. G. Lynn, Judge, United States District Court, she will
practice commercial litigation at Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal.
I See Steve Vogel, Attempting to Mend Lives Shattered by ajet; Sen. RobbJoins Efforts
to Expedite Damages to Families of 20 Killed in Gondola, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1998, at
A02.
2 See Rod Nordland & Tom Masland, Blood on the Snow: After a U.S. Fighter Jet
Clips a Gondola's Cable, Killing 20, Europe Questions America's Character, NEWSWEEK,
Feb. 16, 1998, at 41.
3 See Mark Brinkley, Tough but Expected Punishments Handed Out for Gondola
Crash Fliers, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Aug. 8, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16574817.
4 See id.
5 See Nordland & Masland, supra note 2, at 41.
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below the minimum approved altitude, '6 the crew-members de-
nied flying recklessly. Moreover, they asserted that they were
unaware of the gondola cable strung 370 feet above the
ground.7 Nevertheless, both the United States military court
and the Italian court charged the crew-members with twenty
counts of involuntary manslaughter and twenty counts of negli-
gent homicide.8
On July 13, 1998, Italian Judge Carlo Ancona dismissed the
twenty counts of manslaughter charges against the crew-mem-
bers, as well as the twenty counts of negligent homicide charges,
ruling that Italy lacked jurisdiction to hear the case under the
Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Re-
garding the Status of Their Forces ("NATO SOFA").' Hence,
the crew-members were to be prosecuted in a United States mili-
tary court on twenty counts of involuntary manslaughter and
twenty counts of negligent homicide, as well as other minor
charges such as dereliction of duty and destruction of military
and civilian property.10
Recently, a U.S. court-martial acquitted Ashby of both invol-
untary manslaughter and homicide. I' Moreover, the court
found that Ashby acted without negligence in flying the Prowler
into the gondola cable. 12 As a result of Ashby's acquittal, man-
6 Id.
7 See Peter H. Times, Robb Pushes for U.S. Settlement of Ski Lift Claims, RICHMOND
TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 4, 1998, at B5. Crew-members claim that they were una-
ware of the gondola cable, as their maps failed to document it. See id.
8 See Brinkley, supra note 3.
9 See Victor L. Simpson, Italy Cable-Car Case Against Marines Thrown Out//Judge
Rules That Italian Courts Have No Jurisdiction After Gondola Accident, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, July 14, 1998, at A6. NATO SOFA addresses issues dealing with mili-
tary service people stationed in foreign countries where both the sending and the
receiving state are parties to the Agreement. The following countries are a part
of NATO SOFA: Belgium Feb. 27, 1953, Canada, Aug. 28, 1953, Denmark May 28,
1955, France Sept. 29, 1952, GDRJune 1, 1963, Greece July 26, 1954, Italy Dec.
22, 1955, Luxembourg Mr. 19, 1954, Netherlands Nov. 18, 1953, Norway Feb. 24,
1953, Portugal Nov. 22, 1955, Spain Aug. 10, 1987, Turkey May 18, 1954, United
Kingdom May 13, 1954, and the United StatesJuly 24, 1953. See The North Atlan-
tic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243; Agreement Between the
Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, June
19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 199 U.N.T.S. 67 [hereinafter NATO SOFA].
10 See Brinkley, supra note 3.
11 SeeJohn H. Cushman, Who Should Have Tied Captain Ashby?, 125 UNITED
STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE: PROCEEDINGS 5 (1999) available in 1999 WL 10141195.
12 See id.
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slaughter charges against Schweitzer were dismissed. 3 Thereaf-
ter, the crew-members were found guilty of obstruction of
justice and conspiracy for destroying a videotape of the flight.14
Thus far, Congress has set aside $20 million for property dam-
ages caused by the gondola incident.1 5 Moreover, ten of the
twenty families of the victims have filed wrongful death claims
under NATO, seeking damages ranging from $812,000.00 to
$5.4 million. 6
In advocating for jurisdiction over the claims in the present
case, the United States argued that "the jet was flying under the
auspices of the alliance when the incident occurred" and thus,
the United States had primary criminal jurisdiction under
NATO SOFA.1 7 On the other hand, the Italian prosecutor ar-
gued that because the Prowler violated the mandated flight pat-
terns, the flight was not a United States mission, and therefore,
Italy had primary jurisdiction under NATO SOFA. 8
This Article provides an in depth exploration of these argu-
ments and will ultimately conclude which court should have ex-
ercised criminal and/or civil jurisdiction. Part I begins with a
discussion of the historical background ofjurisdiction and inter-
national law, the predominant theories in the area, and several
Supreme Court decisions regarding the status of forces under
international law. Part II analyzes Article VII of NATO SOFA,
specifically focusing on issues of "foreign criminal jurisdiction"
and "waiver." In addition, this section offers an analysis of the
foreign criminal jurisdiction law under NATO SOFA applied to
the facts of the case at hand, as well as a conclusion as to
whether a United States military court properly had jurisdiction
to try the crew-members involved in the Italian gondola inci-
dent. The latter section of Part II briefly summarizes foreign
civil jurisdiction law under NATO SOFA, and predicts how the
civil claims asserted by the victims' survivors will proceed. Part
III offers a brief insight into the necessity that the United States
maintain positive relations with Italy. Finally, Part IV concludes
13 See Associated Press, Navigator Pleads Guilty to Obstruction, Conspiracy Charges,
FLORIDA TODAY, March 30, 1999, at 07A.
14 See Associated Press, Marine Pilot Found Guilty of Obstruction, FLORIDA TODAY,
May 8, 1999, at 03A.
15 See On Tria4 PEOPLE MAGAZINE, February 8, 1999, at 151.
16 See id.
17 Simpson, supra note 9.
18 See id. Additionally, Italian Prosecutor Francantonio Granero challenged
the constitutionality of NATO SOFA. See id.
6072000]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
with the jurisdiction issues that NATO SOFA raises as well as a
look at the policy arguments behind each issue.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF FOREIGN CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION AND THE MILITARY
A. THEORIES AND CASE LAW REGARDING FOREIGN
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
Two theories regarding international jurisdiction existed
before NATO SOFA was adopted: the law of the flag and territo-
rial sovereignty. 9 The law of the flag principle stands for the
proposition that a military force "operating on foreign soil is in
no way subject to the territorial sovereign and exercises an ex-
clusive right of jurisdiction over its members. °20 The fundamen-
tal assumption behind this principle is that because the military
force of a sending state is a representative of the sovereign, it is
exclusively subject to the "law of the flag. '21 Historically, the law
of the flag principle has been utilized by influential nations. For
example, the United States (arguably the only remaining super-
power) has asserted this theory as governing its military in for-
eign countries for approximately 188 years.22
This principle was first officially recognized in the United
States by Supreme Court dicta in Schooner Exchange v. McFad-
don,23 decided in 1812. In the Schooner opinion, Chief Justice
Marshall stated that a receiving state gives up its territorial juris-
diction when a foreign military force passes through its terri-
tory.24 Chief Justice Marshall's opinion assumed that the need
for military discipline was an essential component of the military
doctrine. In other words, if the military did not have the ability
to discipline its own, the commander would lose control of his
iq See Daniel L. Pagano, Comment, Criminal Jurisdiction Of United States Forces In
Europe, 4 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 189 (1992).
20 SERGE LAZAREFF, STATUS OF MILITARY FORCES UNDER CURRENT INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 12 (1971) (quoting A. Chalfour, LE STATUT JURIDIQUE DES FORCES
ALLIEES PENDANT LA GUERRE 1914-1918 (1927) (unpublished thesis, Paris)).
21 See Stanger, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Visiting Armed Forces, 52 U.S. NAvAL WAR
C. INT'L STUDIES 8 (1965).
22 See LAZAREFF, supra note 20, at 13.
23 11 U.S. 116 (1812). This famous case involved an action brought by Ameri-
cans who claimed to be the owners of the Schooner "Exchange," a vessel that was
seized by the French and made into a ship of war. See id. at 117-19.
24 See id. Chief Justice Marshall stated in dicta, "The grant of a free passage
[through a foreign country], therefore, implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over
the troops, during their passage, and permits the foreign general to use that dis-
cipline, and to inflict those punishments which his army may require." Id. at 140.
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force.25 The Schooner opinion, however, was limited to a military
force "passing through" a foreign country as opposed to one sta-
tioned there.2 6
Sixty years later, in Coleman v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court
expanded the holding of Schooner.27 The Court held that a send-
ing state maintained exclusive jurisdiction over its force stationed
in the receiving state, as well as over its force passing through the
receiving state.28 Thus, for the first time, it was held that a force
passing through the receiving state and a force permanently sta-
tioned in the receiving state were to be treated the same.
Finally, in 1902, the Supreme Court issued its last opinion re-
garding the status of forces before implementing NATO SOFA.
In Tucker v. Alexandroff,29 the Court reaffirmed the holdings of
Schooner and Coleman by specifically recognizing the importance
of each state maintaining military discipline over its own
troops.3 0
Contrary to the law of the flag principle, the territorial sover-
eignty theory gives the receiving state a general right ofjurisdic-
tion over members of a military force on the premise that it
would be unacceptable to prohibit a sovereign state from pun-
ishing an offense committed on its territory. 1 This concept
originated from the theory that a state has supreme jurisdic-
tional interest over anything that happens on its territory. 2
Hence, the receiving state will not allow the sending state to ex-
25 See Archibald King, Jurisdiction over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces, 36 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 539 (1942). If military authority had no ability to punish its own, "forces
would cease to be an army and would become a mob." Id.
26 See Schooner, 11 U.S. 116 (1812). Note that the Schooner decision does not
directly address the modern situation at hand where members of a military force
are sent to a foreign country for a certain length of time, on a friendly basis. It
simply addresses the issue of a military force "passing through" a foreign country.
Nevertheless, it has been used to support the law of the flag principle pertaining
to a military force stationed in a foreign country for a certain period of time. See
I wzARF, supra note 20, at 14-17.
27 97 U.S. 509 (1879).
28 See id. at 515. "It is well settled that a foreign army permitted to march
through a friendly country, or to be stationed in it, by permission of its govern-
ment or sovereign, is exempt from civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place."
Id.
29 Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424 (1902).
30 See id. at 433. "[I]f foreign troops are permitted to enter, or cross our terri-
tory, they are still subject to the control of their officers and exempt from local
jurisdiction." Id.
31 See LAZAROFF, supra note 20, at 17.
32 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402(1) (1986).
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ercise its jurisdiction within the receiving state's territory 3 It is
widely accepted today, that in the absence of a treaty (such as
NATO SOFA), jurisdiction over foreign forces lies exclusively
with the receiving state. 4
In conclusion, the United States Supreme Court has consist-
ently held that a sending state may retain jurisdiction over its
military force stationed in foreign jurisdictions. Because the
United States has an enormously strong international presence,
stationing more military troops in foreign countries than any
other country in the world, it favors the law of the flag principle.
But it is important to note that not all countries adhere to this
principle; hence, the United States' concern for its military
forces stationed in foreign countries has intensified. 5
B. INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION DURING WORLD WAR I
During World War I, the law of the flag principle
predominated. 6 The rationale was thatjurisdictional power was
inseparable from disciplinary power, which was an essential part
of the military organization. 7 During World War I, the United
States (along with a majority of the Allies) argued for exclusive
jurisdiction over its military forces stationed in France. 8 Con-
trary to the territorial principle, which France traditionally ad-
hered to, France permitted the United States (and other Allies)
to retain exclusive jurisdiction, primarily because France was in
a weak bargaining position and needed the Allies' military pres-
ence in its country.39
Although the law of the flag was the predominant theory at
that time, the United Kingdom demanded that forces in its
country recognize the principle of territorial sovereignty.4 °
33 See id. While territorial sovereignty exists in theory, it has never been exclu-
sively adopted by any country. See LAZAROFF, supra note 20, at 17. However, most
countries today rely on territorial sovereignty in arguing for concurrent jurisdic-
tion over foreign military stationed in their territory. Id.
34 See Status of Forces of the North Atlantic Treaty: Supplementary Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1953).
35 See 99 CONG. REc. 9080 (daily ed. July 14, 1953).
36 See LAzAREFF, supra note 20, at 19.
37 See id.
38 See Major Manuel E.F. Supervielle, The Legal Status of Foreign Military Personnel
in the United States, 1994 ARMY LAw 3, 7.
39 See id. This can be seen as an early example of the dominant role that a
country's relative bargaining power plays in determining who has jurisdiction
over its military forces.
40 See Pagano, supra note 19, at 195.
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Although the United States insisted on exclusive jurisdiction
over its military force in Great Britain; Great Britain refused to
recognize the law of the flag principle. 41 Even with extensive
negotiations, the two countries failed to reach a resolution
before the end of World War 1.42
C. INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION DURING WORLD WAR II
The situation was quite different during World War II, when
allied forces were scattered throughout the United Kingdom,
mixing freely with the local population.43 As a result, Great Brit-
ain adopted the Allied Forces Act in 1940. This Act granted the
Allied Military Courts jurisdiction over such issues as "'questions
of discipline and administration regarding the member of the
forces."' 44 Violent crimes such as rape and murder, however,
were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the British courts.45
In 1942, the U.S. forces arrived in Great Britain and immedi-
ately attempted to obtain an exclusive right of jurisdiction over
its forces. 46 Because of Great Britain's need for U.S. forces at
that time, the British Government conceded to the Unites
States, permitting it to retain jurisdiction over U.S. military
forces stationed in Great Britain by enacting the United States
of America Visiting Forces Act.4 7 This Act constituted a "very
considerable departure... from the traditional system and prac-
tice of the United Kingdom" and was only a temporary arrange-
ment due to the necessities of war. 48 Nevertheless, the United
41 See id.
42 See id. at 195-96. Note that during World War I, both the United States and
the United Kingdom were dominant super powers; hence, the intense tug-of-war
between the principles of law of the flag and territorial sovereignty.
43 See LAZAREFF, supra note 20, at 24. The forces stationed in the United King-
dom were "mixed with the population, using public roads, consuming locally
purchased as well as imported goods; their presence was raising completely new
legal problems." Id.
44 Allied Forces Act, 1940, 34 Geo. 6, ch. 5.
45 See id.
46 See IAzAmFF, supra note 20, at 24.
47 See Visiting Forces Act, 1942, 56 Geo. 6, ch. 315. The Visiting Forces Act
states, "[s]ubject as hereinafter provided, no criminal proceedings shall be prose-
cuted in the United Kingdom before any court of the United Kingdom against a
member of the military or naval forces of the United States of America." Id.
48 LZARErF, supra note 20, at 25 (quoting Hearings 6, p. 403). See also G.P.
Barton, Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity From Criminal Jurisdiction, 27 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L. L. 186, 199 (1950). Despite Great Britain's intention that the Visiting
Forces Act be temporary, it served as a model for later agreements entered into
between the United States and Great Britain (including NATO SOFA).
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States was the only country permitted to obtain exclusive juris-
diction over its forces in the United Kingdom.4" Similar to
France in World War I, Great Britain was in a weak bargaining
position because of its need for U.S military forces in its country.
The United States thus emerged again as the 'jurisdictional win-
ner" by retaining jurisdiction over its military force stationed in
Great Britain.5 °
In summary, three points arise out of the study of how foreign
countries historically dealt with the issue of jurisdiction and its
application to their military forces stationed abroad during
World Wars I and II. First, a nation's preference for the law of
the flag principle or territorial sovereignty as its jurisdictional
policy has relied on whether that nation is "primarily a military
force exporter or importer."'5 ' Because the United States tradi-
tionally acted as a military force exporter, it espoused the law of
the flag principle (compared to Italy, who primarily acted as a
military importer, and thus, espoused the principle of territorial
sovereignty). Second, because of the unique situations encoun-
tered during World Wars I and II, countries were willing to
"temporarily adopt the opposite [jurisdictional] position" to suit
their needs regarding the requirement for certain military
forces.52 Finally, the jurisdictional consensus reached in any sta-
tus of forces agreement largely reflects the relative bargaining
power of each party to the agreement at the time the agreement
is made. 53 "Whenever both States are not politically and eco-
nomically equal, the more powerful state will obtain a broader
right of jurisdiction, even in peacetime. '54 Therefore, the more
powerful the nation, the more bargaining power it will have to
retain its preferred jurisdictional principle.
D. INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION POST-WORLD WAR II
Because the end of World War II did not alleviate the neces-
sity of retaining military forces in foreign countries, the jurisdic-
49 See Norman Bentwich, The United States of America Visiting Forces Act, 6 Mon. L.
REv. 68, 72 (1942).
50 This historical illustration serves as yet another example of the United States
getting its way with foreign jurisdictions because of its super-power status.
51 Supervielle, supra note 38, at 9.
52 Id. This was illustrated in World War I with France and in World War II with
Great Britain, when both countries permitted the United States to retain exclu-
sive jurisdiction over its military force, even though France and Great Britain
adhered to the territorial sovereignty principle. See id.
53 See id.
54 Id. at 9.
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tional conflicts remained and the United States and other
countries created several different types of jurisdictional agree-
ments. A limited number of countries permitted the United
States to retain exclusive jurisdiction over its military stationed
in their countries.5 5 Other countries (primarily third-world
countries), determined jurisdiction by geographical partition. 6
In other words, these countries gave the United States exclusive
jurisdiction over offenses committed by the U.S. military only
where "members of the American Forces [had] the right to go
and orders [had] been given accordingly. '57 Finally, the major-
ity of countries gave the United States "concurrent jurisdiction"
over its military forces. At that time, concurrentjurisdiction rec-
onciled the concept of territorial sovereignty with the law of the
flag principle, and hence, formed the basis for the Treaty of
Brussels and later, NATO SOFA.
The Treaty of Brussels, signed March 17, 1948, represents the
first agreement between European nations that contemplated
Allied troops remaining in European countries for an indefinite
period of time. Although representing a concurrent jurisdic-
tional approach, the Treaty of Brussels recognized the principle
of territorial sovereignty in Article 7:
It is the duty of 'members of a foreign force' to respect the laws
in force in the 'receiving State' and to abstain from any activity
inconsistent with the spirit of the present Agreement, and, in
particular, from any political activity.... Members of a 'foreign
force' who commit and offence in the 'receiving State' against
the laws in force in that State can be prosecuted in the courts of
the 'receiving State.'58
On the other hand, the Treaty of Brussels further provided
that if the offense committed in the receiving state also violated
the sending state's laws, the receiving state should consider
"with the greatest sympathy" conferring jurisdiction to the send-
ing state.59 Ultimately, the terms of the article determined juris-
diction based on both the amount of damage done to either
state and the respective interests of both states.
55 These countries included Korea, Ethiopia, and Japan.
56 See LzAr , supra note 20, at 39-42.
57 Id. at 40-42. This gave the United States exclusive jurisdiction because it was
highly unlikely that an offense would be committed outside of these zones. How-
ever, even if an offense was committed outside of these zones, the American au-
thorities would routinely intervene to obtain jurisdiction over the offense. See id.
58 Treaty of Brussels, at art. 7, para. 1.
59 Treaty of Brussels, at art. 7, para. 2.
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In summary, under the Treaty of Brussels, the receiving state
enjoyed the exclusive right ofjurisdiction only when the offense
violated its own laws, but not those of the sending state. More-
over, if the offense committed was punishable under both the
sending and the receiving state's laws, concurrent jurisdiction
existed.60 Article 7, paragraph 2 of the Treaty divided these of-
fenses into two categories: (1) offenses against the law of the
sending state or against its property, or against a member of the
force to which the offender belonged; and (2) all other of-
fenses. 61 Regarding the first category, the receiving state had
authority to prosecute only if it concluded that "special consid-
erations require[d] them to do So. ''62 Offenses committed
under the second category were subject to the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the receiving state. Hence, the Treaty of Brussels resur-
rected the territorial sovereignty principle and attempted to
alleviate the law of the flag principle.
II. NATO SOFA
A. INTRODUCTION
On April 4, 1949, thirteen politically free and economically
stable countries joined together to create the Agreement Be-
tween the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (hereinafter
"NATO").63 This Agreement resulted from an effort to create
uniform political, economic, and military sanctions to defend
against communist expansion and aggression.64 Subsequently,
on June 19, 1951, NATO SOFA was signed.65 This Agreement
asserted the duties, rights, and obligations of a visiting force sta-
tioned in a foreign state. While NATO SOFA laid out the rights
and duties of signatories in many important areas, the heart of
the Agreement concerned criminal jurisdiction over foreign
military personnel, as asserted in Article VII.6 6 Within the crimi-
60 See LAzAREFF, supra note 20, at 47.
61 See Treaty of Brussels, at art. 7, para. 2.
62 Id. Thus, in this situation, it appears that the receiving state had priority
jurisdiction, leaving the sending state with jurisdiction only when the receiving
state waived its right to prosecute the offense. See id.
63 See The North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243
[hereinafter NATO].
64 See ROBERT B. ELLERT, NATO 'FAIR TRIAL' SAFEGUARDS: PRECURSOR TO AN IN-
TERNATIONAL BILL OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS 1 (1963). It has been stated that NATO
"contemplated an unprecedented peacetime stationing of the forces of one party
in the territory of another." Id.
65 See NATO SOFA, supra note 9.
66 See ELLERT, supra note 64, at 2.
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nal jurisdiction provisions, NATO SOFA attempted to address
the issues pertaining to: (1) when a military force stationed in a
foreign state committed an offense; (2) and when both the
sending and the receiving state had concurrent jurisdiction.67
This formula apportioned the right to exercise jurisdiction on a
reciprocal basis depending on the paramount interests of each
state. In summary, the sending state received jurisdiction over
offenses against the sending state's property or its nationals
committed by its force while performing official duties. On the
other hand, the receiving state retained primary jurisdiction
over offenses committed by a visiting force against the receiving
state's nationals, which were anticipated to cause resentment
among the citizens of the receiving state (i.e. murder, rape).
Article VII is the most popular article of NATO SOFA and has
attracted wide debate and comment since its inception. The ar-
ticle has been the subject of intense debate simply because of its
subject matter-foreign criminal jurisdiction over military
forces, which directly implicates the opposing principles of the
law of the flag and territorial sovereignty.68 NATO SOFA states
have historically favored one principle, depending on their role
as a receiving state versus their role as a sending state.69 More-
over, other problems regarding the misunderstanding or misin-
terpretation of foreign law present themselves in Article VII.
For example, the United States' historical distrust of certain
NATO SOFA countries (i.e. France and Italy) and their corre-
sponding laws and imposable punishments clearly formed the
basis for the negative reaction by U.S. Congressmen and public
opinion to the Agreement during its introduction.70 Finally, na-
tionalistic emotions tended to be greatly aroused by the subject
of Article VII. In particular, strong United States sentiments
emerged from the arguments put forth during the hearings on
NATO SOFA.71 Some nationalists denounced Article VII be-
cause it subjected U.S. servicemen to the jurisdiction of the re-
67 See id. Specifically, Article VII deals with the allocation of criminal jurisdic-
tional rights, the cooperation between states in criminal matters, and the author-
ity of the military police. See LAZAREFF, supra note 20, at 128.
68 See LAzAREmr, supra note 20, at 128.
69 It is the premise of this Article that the United States has traditionally leaned
in favor of the law of the flag principle because of its inherent national power
and traditional role as a sending state.
70 See LAzAaErr, supra note 20, at 129.
71 See id.
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ceiving state.72 This criticism was largely due to the fact that the
United States had primarily been a sending state under NATO
SOFA. Specifically, the forces of the United States stationed in
foreign states outnumbered the 12,000 foreign troops stationed
in the United States during 1955. 73 On the other hand, some
influential Americans voiced their support of NATO SOFA and
were willing to hand over some criminal jurisdiction claims
against U.S. servicemen to the receiving states (or at least give
the appearance of handing over some criminal jurisdiction
claims) .1 In other words, the U.S. leaders that initially sup-
72 See ELLERT, supra note 64, at 2. The following excerpt serves as an example
of the vehement emotions exemplified by some Americans over the jurisdictional
compromises made in NATO SOFA:
One hundred and seventy-nine years ago our country proclaimed
the independence of the United States of America and all her citi-
zens. Foreign potentates and the barratorious empires of Europe
were put on notice that Americans would no longer tolerate the
evil practices of laws over which they had no control. To protect
our people from the wretched canons of remote kingdoms our an-
cestors fought and died in a war called the 'Revolution'. To protect
our ships and sailors and soldiers from the humilities imposed
upon them by foreign monarchs our ancestors fought and died in a
war called the 'War of 1812'. In both of these wars the men of the
National Guard made the ultimate sacrifice.
In 1951, one hundred and seventy-five years after our people se-
cured their independence and were protected by the Bill of Rights,
our Department of State negotiated for the surrender of the birth
rights of those who wear the uniform of the United States. On July
15, 1953, the Senate of the United States ratified a vicious treaty
which defamed and disparaged the rights of freeborn men who
happen to be in the service of this formerly sovereign country.
Yes, it is true that American soldiers and Guardsman abroad are
subject to trial under foreign law and denied the constitutional pro-
tections for which many generations of militia men have gallantly
laid down their lives. Yes, you G.I.'s and Guardsman are now sub-
ject to the injustices that are handed down by magistrates and juries
in those foreign lands where the people write 'Yankee Go Home'
on every wall and building. Yes, it is true that the kangaroo and
Star Chamber court procedures; local police brutalities; and in
some instances communist judges and juries are the rewards that
our men in uniform earn by serving under the flag of the United
States in Europe and Japan. Yes, it is indeed a sad travesty on Jus-
tice to deprive American troops overseas of the protection of the
Government and Constitution for which they must give their very
lives to defend.
[AZAREFE, supra note 20, at 129-30 (citing Bennett and Kirck, Tyranny by Treaty,
TuE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL JOURNAL, July 1955).
73 See Hearings Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.J. Res.
309, 84th Cong., 1st (and 2nd) Sess. 271 (1956).
74 For example, President Eisenhower stated in a letter:
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ported the inception of NATO SOFA anticipated that the
United States would maintain exclusive jurisdiction over its mili-
tary forces stationed abroad.75
In conclusion, the U.S. citizens who participated in drafting
Article VII experienced intense emotional debate during the
process. The United States historically played a dominant role
as a sending state and thus, maintained control over its military
forces stationed abroad. By becoming a member of NATO
SOFA, the United States risked equalizing its advantageous for-
eign criminal jurisdiction position with other NATO SOFA
countries. Nevertheless, despite that risk, the United States be-
came a member of NATO SOFA, arguably not anticipating that
its military forces abroad would ever really be subject to another
country's criminal jurisdiction. Thus, it is likely that many of the
problems encountered when using NATO SOFA today are pres-
ent because of legal aspects which were assumedly overlooked
(or simply ignored) because of emotional considerations during
the drafting process.
B. THE UNITED STATES AND NATO SOFA NEGOTIATIONS
In drafting NATO SOFA, the drafting committee (hereinafter
"the Working Group") faced two draft proposals: the Brussels
Agreement and the American counterproposal. As discussed
earlier, the Brussels Agreement, for the most part, adopted the
principle of territorial sovereignty. 76 The American counterpro-
posal, on the other hand, naturally espoused the law of the flag
principle. According to U.S. Secretary of State Murphy, during
the preliminary and semi-official negotiations, the United States
made every effort to convince the Working Group to adopt its
view that criminal jurisdiction should reside exclusively with the
sending state.77 It was apparent to the Working Group that the
I can certainly appreciate the concern of those who fear that these
agreements might subject American soldiers overseas to systems of
criminal justice foreign to our own traditions. I do not share such
fears, however, because of the many years experience I have had in
command of American troops overseas. That experience convinces
me that our friends abroad will continue to cooperate, as they have
in the past, in turning over those charged with offenses against
their laws to our own military courts for trial.
LA.zAREr_, supra note 20, at 130.
75 See LAzAmRFF, supra note 20, at 130-31.
76 See supra notes 58, 59, 61-62.
77 See LAzAREr, supra note 20, at 130-32.
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United States would not waive its rights to exercise jurisdiction
over foreign military personnel stationed in the United. States.78
During the course of negotiations, the United States drafted a
"compromise proposal," which, for the most part, comprises the
text of present-day Article VII.79 The most significant "compro-
mise" in this proposal was the understanding that criminal juris-
diction over an offense committed by a serviceman stationed in
a foreign country would be concurrent with primary jurisdiction
residing in the sending state.80 It is arguable, however, whether
this was really a compromise at all on the part of the United
States. The United States was concerned only with the ultimate
result, that it retain criminal jurisdiction over acts committed by
its military in foreign countries, and not with whether the juris-
diction it obtained was termed exclusive or concurrent.8" As dis-
cussed below, the U.S. military law is broadly interpreted for the
purpose of encompassing the majority of offenses committed by
its servicemen. Nevertheless, although some Americans op-
posed NATO SOFA, many commentators have argued that the
Agreement represents a successful "compromise" between the
NATO SOFA nations (with the United States ultimately getting
its way).
C. EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
Paragraph 2 of Article VII authorizes exclusive criminal juris-
diction in two situations. In the first situation, when an offense
is punishable by the sending state but not the receiving state,
the sending state has exclusive criminal jurisdiction over its mili-
tary personnel. In the second situation, when the offense is
punishable by the receiving state but not the sending state, the
receiving state has exclusive criminal jurisdiction. 2 In other
78 See id. This was due to the conflicting federal-state relationship in the Amer-
ican Union and the fear that American states may try to assert their rights to
exercise jurisdiction over foreign forces. See id. at 132.
79 See id.
80 See id.
81 See id. The Senate, in efforts to maintain criminal jurisdiction over its mili-
tary stationed in foreign countries at all times, produced a regulation that stated
"[c]onstant efforts [would] be made to establish relationships and methods of
operation with host country authorities that [would] maximize U.S. jurisdiction
to the extent permitted by applicable agreements." Army Reg. 27-50/
SECNAVINST 5820.4G/Air Force Reg. 110-12 (Jan. 14, 1990), Status of Forces
Policies, Procedures, and Information, para. 1-7(a).
82 See NATO SOFA, supra note 9, at art. VII, para. 2. The exclusive jurisdiction
provision provides:
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words, the state whose law is not violated does not have an inter-
est in or a right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over the
offense.83
But, when an offense is committed that is punishable under
both the sending and the receiving states' laws, exclusive juris-
diction no longer applies; rather, a case of concurrent jurisdic-
tion subject to the provisions of Article VII, paragraph 3 evolves.
Although several problems of interpretation arise from Article
VII,8 4 the most problematic issue relating to this Article is one in
theory. The issue is as follows: when an offense is committed in
a receiving state, do not both the receiving and the sending
states have an interest in prosecuting that offense?8 5 The receiv-
ing state arguably has an interest in prosecuting all offenses that
occur within its territory. Conversely, the sending state has an
interest in prosecuting its own military force and an inherent
interest in protecting its military force's constitutional rights.
Furthermore, most violations in the receiving state constitute vi-
olations in the sending state. Hence, in reality, a situation
where either the sending or the receiving state has exclusive ju-
risdiction is rare.
Most violations committed by U.S. military servicemen against
the laws of the receiving state are also deemed to be against the
sending state by means of Article 134 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (hereinafter "UCMJ").86 Specifically, this catch-
2.a. The military authorities of the sending State shall have the
right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the
military law of that State with respect to offences, including of-
fences relating to its security, punishable by the law of the sending
State, but not by the law of the receiving state.
2.b. The authorities of the receiving State shall have the right to
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over members of a force or civilian
component and their dependents with respect to offences, includ-
ing offences relating to the security of that State, punishable by its
law but not by the law of the sending State.
2.c. For the purpose of this paragraph and of paragraph 3 of this
Article a security offence against a State shall include:
treason against the State;
sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to official
secrets of that State, or secrets relating to the national defense
of that State.
Id.
83 See LAZAmeFF, supra note 20, at 151.
84 See generally id. at 151-54.
85 See id. at 151.
86 SeeJOSEPH M. SNEE & KENNETH A. PY, STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT: CRIMI-
NAL JURISDICTION 24-25 (1957). See also United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94
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all provision grants criminal jurisdiction over "all disorders and
neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the
armed forces" and "all conduct of a nature to bring discredit
upon the armed forces."8 7 By interpreting Article 134 of the
UCMJ broadly, the United States has the ability to deny exclu-
sive jurisdiction to the receiving state for virtually any crime
committed by its military.88 One of the main policies behind the
expansion of Article 134 was to reduce the scope of foreign
criminal jurisdiction over U.S. forces. 89 By expanding Article
134 to include all, or at least the majority of criminal offenses
committed by its military force in the receiving state, the United
States has been able to retain criminal jurisdiction (albeit con-
current jurisdiction) over its military stationed in foreign
countries.9 °
The breadth of the UCMJ is significant because of the waiver
provision found in Article VII, paragraph 3 of NATO SOFA.
This provision implies that no waiver of jurisdiction may be
sought from a receiving state with exclusive jurisdiction. But if
an offensive act is deemed a violation of UCMJ Article 134, as
well a violation of the receiving state's laws, the sending state
may request a waiver of jurisdiction (because each state is then
said to have concurrent jurisdiction). Once a waiver has been
sought, the receiving state is required to give the waiver request
"sympathetic consideration."9
(1922) and United States v. Keaton, 41 C.M.R. 64, 66 (C.M.A. 1969) (proposing
that the United States does not prevent the exercise of extraterritorial criminal
jurisdiction).
87 Uniform Military Code of Justice, art. 134 [hereinafter UCMJ]. The test
used in determining whether an act committed by a U.S. military serviceman is a
violation of the UCMJ is: (1) whether the act is a disorder or neglect to the preju-
dice of good order; or (2) whether the act brings discredit upon the armed
forces. If the answer to either of these questions is "yes," the act is considered a
violation of U.S. military law and, hence, is not subject to exclusive jurisdiction of
the receiving state. See id.
88 This coincides with what the Senate's goals were prior to ratification, as they
were assured that most violations of foreign law would be punishable under the
UCMJ. See Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,
83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion, Armed Forces and Military Headquarters.
89 See Rouse and Baldwin, The Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction under the NATO
Status Agreement, 51 AM.J. INT'L. L. 39 (1957).
90 Historically, U.S. Representatives took the position that any violation of the
receiving state's law was a per se violation of the UCMJ. However, their position
has been modified and they have held that not every violation of a foreign state
law is a violation of the UCMJ. See SNEE & PvE, supra note 86.
91 See NATO SOFA, supra note 9, at art VII, para. 3 (c).
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In analyzing whether the United States or Italy had proper
criminal jurisdiction over the offense committed in the case at
hand, the first question is whether the offense gave rise to exclu-
sive jurisdiction on the part of the sending state or the receiving
state. The U.S. military courts have held that a negligent offense
committed by a military serviceman that causes personal injury
to the victim does not automatically give rise to an offense under
the UCMJ.92 On the other hand, the U.S. military courts have
held that the first or second clause of UCMJ Article 134 governs
if the negligent offense results in death. Thus in this case,
where the alleged offenses charged against the U.S. military
crew-members included claims of negligent homicide and invol-
untary manslaughter, and where the end-result of these charges
was death, a violation of UCMJ Article 134 allegedly has oc-
curred. Therefore, as properly concluded by Italian authorities,
Italy did not have the right to exercise exclusive criminal jurisdic-
tion over the claim of negligent homicide nor involuntary man-
slaughter against the crew-members. Conversely, the United
States clearly did not have exclusive criminal jurisdiction over
the offenses because claims of both negligent homicide and in-
voluntary manslaughter are chargeable offenses under Italian
law. Therefore, the case at hand was quite clearly one of con-
current jurisdiction.
D. CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
Where the offense committed in the receiving state is punish-
able under both the receiving and the sending state's laws, con-
current jurisdiction arises. Under these circumstances, both
states theoretically possess a right to exercise criminal jurisdic-
tion over the offender. The majority of jurisdictional conflicts
under NATO SOFA arise under this provision because both
states retain the right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over the
offense (because each state's laws have been violated). Because
of the necessity for military maintenance command and disci-
pline, the sending state has an interest in prosecuting its own
servicemen (as well as protecting its servicemen's constitutional
rights). On the other hand, the receiving state has an interest in
prosecuting offenses against its public order. In light of these
overlapping considerations, NATO SOFA has attempted to allo-
cate primary rights to exercise criminal jurisdiction between the
92 See United States v. Kirchner, 4 C.M.R. 69-70 (1952).
93 See United States v. Eagleson, 11 C.M.R. 893, 897 (1953).
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states. Specifically, according to Article VII, paragraph 3(a), in
the instance of concurrent jurisdiction, the sending state has the
primary right to exercise criminal jurisdiction in two instances:
first, when the offense is committed solely against its personnel
or property; and second, when the offense is committed in the
performance of official duty. The receiving state has primary
jurisdiction in all other concurrent jurisdiction cases.94 Because
the definition of an offense committed against a state's.person-
nel or property is fairly straightforward (and further, not the
subject of the case at hand), this Article will focus on one of the
most controversial provisions of NATO SOFA: the issue of what
constitutes an act or omission done in the performance of offi-
cial duty.
1. Offenses Committed in the Performance of Official Duty
It is well established that the courts of a receiving state are not
competent to try offenses committed by foreign servicemen in
the performance of their official duty.9" When a military service-
man is performing official duties, he is carrying out instructions
from his state and should not be brought before the courts of
the receiving state. 96 Nevertheless, although it is clear that a mil-
itary serviceman may not be prosecuted in the receiving state for
an offense committed in the performance of official duty, it is
unclear what actually constitutes the performance of official
94 See NATO SOFA, supra note 9, at art. VII, para. 3.
In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the
following rules shall apply:
The military authorities of the sending State shall have the primary
right to exercise jurisdiction over a member of a force or of a civil-
ian component in relation to
i. offences solely against the property or security of that State, or
offences solely against the person or property of another member
of the force or civilian component of that State or of a dependant;
ii. offences arising out of any act or omission done in the perform-
ance of official duty.
b. In the case of any other offence the authorities of the receiving
State shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction.
c. If the State having the primary right decides not to exercise juris-
diction, it shall notify the authorities of the other State as soon as
practicable. The authorities of the State having the primary right
shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authori-
ties of the other State for a waiver of its right in cases where that
other state considers such waiver to be of particular importance.
Id.
95 See LAzAPEnr, supra note 20, at 170.
96 See id.
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duty. Two issues emerge in the interpretation of this concept.
The first issue is: when does an offense arise out of an act or
omission done in the performance of official duty (or the scope
of official duty). The second issue is: who is given the right to
define the scope of official duty.
a. Scope of Official Duty
The drafting committee was unable to agree on a definition
of the scope of official duty, and to date, NATO SOFA is silent
on the issue.97 While the working papers are not definitive, they
do add more understanding to this concept. In the first draft of
NATO SOFA, the sending state was given exclusive jurisdiction
over "all acts done in the performance of official duty."98 Subse-
quently, the second and third drafts gave the sending state pri-
mary jurisdiction over those acts done in the performance of
official duty.99 In all three of these drafts, an "official duty of-
fense" was defined as "'an offence arising out of an act done in
the performance of official duty or pursuant to a lawful order
issued by the military authorities' of the sending [s] tate."100 In-
asmuch as the drafting committee was aware of the vagueness of
the definition, they deferred action on the Agreement until this
definition could be clarified.
During negotiations of the Agreement, Italy supported NATO
SOFA's theory regarding offenses committed in the perform-
ance of official duty in principle ; however, it wanted a more
precise definition of what was meant by a member of an armed
force "on duty."101 Specifically, the Italian Representative as-
serted that the wording should not only mean that the act was
done in the performance of official duty, but that it was done
within the limits of that official duty.10 2
97 See id. at 173.
98 Id.
- See id.
- Id. (quoting DR (51) 15).
101 LAZAREFF, supra note 20, at 174 (citing MS (J)-R (51)2, par. 13).
102 See id. (citing MS (J)-R (51)14, par. 30). The Italian Representative used
the example of a driver on official business to illustrate his point. He explained
that if the driver deviated from the direct route for reasons of official business
and the accident occurred during such deviation, the driver could reasonably
claim that he was acting in the performance of official duty. But if the driver
deviated from the direct route for personal reasons and the accident occurred
during such deviation, the driver could not claim that he was acting in the per-
formance of official duty. See id.
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Applying this definition to the case at hand, if the crew-mem-
bers were specifically flying the Prowler according to their au-
thorities' orders, then the crew-members would have been
acting in the performance of official duty, and therefore, the
United States would have primary jurisdiction over their alleged
offenses. However, if the crew-members were acting outside of
their authorities' orders (i.e. flying lower than instructed, flying
faster than instructed, flying off-course), then the crew-members
could not claim that they were acting in the performance of offi-
cial duty, and hence, Italy would have primary jurisdiction over
the offense. 03
U.S. military authorities, on the other hand, have never at-
tempted to expressly communicate their definition of an offense
effected during the performance of official duty.10 Instead,
they have preferred to extend the coverage of this concept as far
as possible, arguably using their power as the largest sending
state to retain primary jurisdiction in most instances."0 5
In summary, the two most common "definitions" asserted by
NATO SOFA members in effort to define an offense committed
while in the performance of official duty are those opposing ex-
planations represented by Italy and the United States. First, as
Italy asserts, an offense is committed in the performance of offi-
cial duty if and only if it was committed within the limits of that
official duty. Conversely, as the United States argues, virtually
any offense committed by its military surrounding the duties of
the United States military is committed in the performance of
official duty. To date, because NATO SOFA has provided no
guidelines that officially define the scope of official duty, each
country is left to rely on its own definition. Thus, the obvious
conflict arises when, in cases such as the one at hand, the send-
ing state's military force commits an offense in the receiving
state, and the issue of concurrent jurisdiction arises. In this in-
stance, it is necessary to understand the definition of "perform-
103 This analysis is similar to the much legislated topic of "scope of employ-
ment" found in U.S. agency law. See infra note 126-28.
104 See SNEE & PYE, supra note 86, at 47.
105 See id. United States military authorities have typically tended to interpret
acts done in the performance of official duty similar to the concept of "scope of
employment," but broader. For example, several cases have held that an officer
driving his car to work from home is acting within the performance of official
duty. See id. Thus, it is interesting to note the difference in the way that the
United States defines "scope of employment" for the military and "scope of em-
ployment" for the remainder of U.S. citizens. See infra note 126-28.
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ance of official duty" to determine which country has primary
jurisdiction.
b. Who Defines Scope of Official Duty
As concluded from the discussion above, because NATO
SOFA provides no set definition of an offense committed in the
performance of official duty, and because NATO SOFA coun-
tries have varying definitions of the phrase, it is necessary to
know whether the sending state or the receiving state has au-
thority to assert its interpretation in defining the scope of offi-
cial duty. Each state has an interest in exercising criminal
jurisdiction in this instance. Thus, common sense dictates that
the sending state will define the scope of official duty in its
broadest sense, while the receiving state will define the term in
its narrowest sense. °6 At the drafting convention, the United
States insisted that the sending state's military authorities had
sole power to determine whether its military personnel were
conducting official duty, and whether the offenses committed by
them were committed in the performance of such official du-
ties.10 7 Hence, it is clear from the drafting history that the
Working Group contemplated the possibility that the military
authorities from the sending state should determine whether an
offense committed by a member of its force was committed
while performing official duty. 0 8
Because NATO SOFA is silent on this issue, the sending state
must obtain the acquiescence of the receiving state in order to
exercise a right of primary jurisdiction.109 This is typically done
by the sending state's issuance of an "'official duty certificate,"'
which is simply a request for the receiving state's waiver of crimi-
nal jurisdiction and permission for the sending state's exercise
106 See Pagano, supra note 14, at 202.
107 See LAZAREFF, supra note 20, at 174-75 (citing MS-R (51)14, par. 31).
108 See SNEE & PYiE, supra note 85, at 51.
109 See id. Although not specifically stated in NATO SOFA itself, persons
closely involved with the adoption of the Agreement have stated that one of the
criterion for determining whether the sending or the receiving state has primary
criminal jurisdiction is the "predominant test." See JOHN WOODLIFE, THE PEACE-
TIME USE OF FOREIGN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS UNDER MODERN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 178 (1992). Further, others have suggested that the decision as to which
country will exercise primaryjurisdiction is not really based on doctrine at all, but
rather on "conceptions of good faith, reasonableness, and efficacy." Mark R.
Ruppert, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Environmental Offenses Committed Overseas: How
To Maximize And When To Say No, 40 A.F.L. REV. 1, 7 (1996) (citing G.I.A.D.
DRAPER, CIILIANS AND THE NATO STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT 14 (1966)).
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of criminal jurisdiction.110 Although many of the receiving
states have made it clear that they would accept the determina-
tion of certain authorities of the United States military on this
issue, and therefore accept an official duty certificate from them
without question,111 recall that NATO SOFA requires only that
the receiving state give the request "sympathetic considera-
tion."'1 12 Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the United
States' policy of requesting waivers of foreign criminal jurisdic-
tion in cases regarding its military force "has led to the result
that American forces are in fact 'extraterritorial' (and de facto
following law of the flag principles), rather than subject to for-
eign criminal jurisdiction (with certain exceptions)."' Some
reasons that have been asserted in explanation of the United
States' success in securing waivers are: (1) the receiving state's
growing confidence in the U.S. military justice system's prosecu-
tors and courts; (2) better communication between the sending
state and the receiving state regarding these matters; (3) a per-
ception that the United States is harsher in its dealings with
criminal offenses than local courts; and (4) the receiving state's
desire to conserve judicial expense and law enforcement
resources.
114
Specific to this case, Italy has generally recognized that the
sending state has the authority to make the "official duty" deter-
mination." 5 Thus, Italy has typically acquiesced to United
States' decisions regarding primary jurisdiction. I 6 Moreover, in
several cases, action by the Italian military courts has actually
been suspended upon the United States' presentation of an offi-
110 See Major Steven J. Lepper, A Primer on Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, 37 A.F.L.
REv. 169, 176 (1994). In some cases, the receiving state will accept the sending
state's official duty definition. But in the other instances, the certificate creates a
rebuttable presumption of official duty status. See id.
- See SNEE & PVF, supra note 85, at 51.
112 See NATO SOFA, supra note 9, at art. VII, para. 3(c).
113 See Ruppert, supra note 109, at 7 (citing GEORGE STAMBUK, AMERiCAN MILI-
TARY FORCES ABROAD 52, 110-11 (1963)).
114 Davis, Waiver and Recall of Primary Concurrent Jurisdiction in Germany, THE
ARMY LAw, May 1988, at 30 (citing United States Army, Europe & 7th Army, Inter-
national Affairs Division, Recall Rate, Ten-Year Analysis: 1977-1986 (1986)).
115 See LAZAREFF, supra note 20, at 180.
116 See SNEE & PYE, supra note 85, at 53. For example, the operating procedures
of the U.S. military stationed in Italy specifically state that a waiver of primary
Italian jurisdiction should be requested "when the commander believes the case
has particular importance in maintaining proper standards of discipline." U.S.
Sending State Office for Italy Instruction 5820.1B, Operating Procedures in Italy
Under Article VII, NATO Status of Forces Agreement (Feb. 23, 1994).
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cial duty certificate. Tension has exists amongst Italian prosecu-
tors, however, whom have voiced their desire to prosecute
certain offenses in their own jurisdiction. Therefore, it is not
entirely settled in Italy that the determination of "official duty"
is a question solely for the sending state to resolve.' 1 7
E. CONCLUSION ON NATO SOFA CRIMINAL JURISICTION
In applying the concurrent jurisdictional analysis of NATO
SOFA to the present case, one realizes the problems created by
the ambiguities previously discussed. If the United States, as the
sending state, did in fact have the power to define the scope of
official duty, clearly it would argue that the crew-members were
acting in the performance of official duty in that they were per-
forming a training flight mission when the offense occurred.
Therefore, the offense would have been committed in the per-
formance of official duty and hence, the United States would
have primary jurisdiction. In contrast, if Italy, as the receiving
state, was authorized to define the scope of official duty, it
would argue that the crew-members were not performing an of-
ficial duty because they were acting outside of their official duty
by flying off course, as well as too low and too fast. Therefore,
the crew-members' performance would fall out of the scope of
official duty. As a result, the crew-members' offense would not
have occurred in the performance of official duty, and Italy
would be deemed to have primary jurisdiction.
As determined from the procedural aspects of this case, the
United States prevailed in its claim of primary jurisdiction over
the crew-members' offense. Although it cannot be factually
stated that this decision was incorrect, one can glean from the
historical content of this Article the underlying factor of the
United States' super power status that undoubtedly played a
part in this jurisdictional decision. Is this result one that the
117 For example, from the time period of Dec. 1 1003 to Nov. 30, 1994, the
"waiver rate" (the amount of waivers successfully obtained by the United States
out of those applied for) in Italy was only 50.3%. Compare this to the fact that
during this same time period, 5840 U.S. military members were subject to pri-
mary foreign jurisdiction and a waiver was obtained by the United States in 4492
of those cases (or 89%). In viewing the two statistics together, the predictability
of Italy's granting a waiver requested by the United States is not all that certain.
DOD Report, Statistics on the Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction by Foreign Tribu-
nals over United States Personnel (1 Dec. 1993-30 Nov. 1994) (prepared by the
Department of the Army, Office of the Judge Advocate General, as DoD's Execu-
tive Agent).
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Working Group would have reached? Moreover, is this jurisdic-
tional decision fair?
F. FOREIGN CIVIL JURISDICTION
Though it may be predicted with some certainty whether a
member of the sending state's military force is to be prosecuted
in a criminal proceeding, and if so, whether the sending or the
receiving state will exercise foreign criminal jurisdiction, the
task becomes even more predictable with regard to foreign civil
jurisdiction. Article VIII, paragraph 5 of NATO SOFA contains
the guidelines for third parties asserting civil claims against a
member of the sending state's military force."1 8 It should be
118 See NATO SOFA, supra note 9, at art. VIII, para. 5. Article VIII, paragraph 5
of the Agreement provides:
5. Claims... arising out of acts or omissions of members of a force
or civilian component done in the performance of official duty, or
out of any other act, omission or occurrence for which a force or
civilian component is legally responsible, and causing damage in
the receiving State to third parties, other than any of the Con-
tracting Parties, shall be dealt with by the receiving State in accord-
ance with the following provisions:
a. Claims shall be filed, considered and settled or adjudicated in
accordance with the laws and regulations of the receiving State
with respect to claims arising from the activities of its own armed
forces.
b. The receiving State may settle any such claims, and payment
of the amount agreed upon or determinated by adjudication
shall be made by the receiving State in its currency.
c. Such payment, whether made pursuant to a settlement or to
adjudication of the case by a competent tribunal of the receiving
State, or the final adjudication by such a tribunal denying pay-
ment, shall be binding and conclusive upon the Contracting
parties.
d. Every claim paid by the receiving State shall be communi-
cated to the sending States concerned together with full particu-
lars and a proposed distribution in conformity with sub-
paragraphs e. (i), (ii) and (iii) below. In default of a reply
within two months, the proposed distribution shall be regarded
as accepted.
e. The cost incurred in satisfying claims pursuant to the preced-
ing sub-paragraphs and para. 2 of this Article shall be distributed
between the Contracting Parties, as follows:
i. Where one sending State alone is responsible, the amount
awarded or adjudged shall be distributed in the proportion of
25 per cent; chargeable to the receiving State and 75 per
cent, chargeable to the sending State ....
iv. Every half-year, a statement of the sums paid by the re-
ceiving State in the course of the half-yearly period in respect
of every case regarding which the proposed distribution on a
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noted, however, that these guidelines are not always explicitly
followed.
On the international legal stage, the doctrine known as "sov-
ereign immunity" may be relied upon by the sending state. This
doctrine stands for the fact that all states are equal, and hence,
no state can exercise jurisdiction over another state.' Further-
more, as seen above, Article VII of NATO SOFA provides a
waiver of foreign criminal jurisdiction for all offenses committed
by a military service person while in the performance of official
duty.12° Hence, because of the high number of military troops
stationed in foreign countries (and therefore, the increased
number of opportunities for foreign military persons to commit
crimes), it was necessary to create a provision in NATO SOFA
which addressed how the issue of civil liability would be handled
when property of the receiving state or a third person was
harmed by an act or omission on the part of a foreign military
service person. Article VIII, paragraph 5 of NATO SOFA was
intentionally written in broad terms in effort to provide a third
party that was damaged by a sending state's military force on the
territory of the receiving state the ability to settle his or her
claim(s) .121 Under this Article, the sending state is liable to the
percentage basis has been accepted, shall be sent to the send-
ing States concerned, together with a request for reimburse-
ment. Such reimbursement shall be made within the shortest
possible time, in the currency of the receiving State.
f. In cases where the application of the provisions of sub-para-
graph b. and e. of this paragraph would cause a Contracting
Party serious hardship, it may request the North Atlantic Coun-
cil to arrange a settlement of a different nature.
g. A member of a force or a civilian component shall not be
subject to any proceedings for the enforcement of any judge-
ment given against him in the receiving State in a matter arising
from the performance of his official duties.
Id.
119 See Supervielle, supra note 33, at 6.
120 See NATO SOFA, supra note 9, at art. VII.
121 See LAZARFF, supra note 20, at 304. It is interesting to note here that para-
graph 5 of Article VIII refers to any third parties other than the sending state or
the receiving state. In other words, the third persons asserting a civil claim are
not required to be of the same nationality as that of the receiving state. This is a
very different concept in the field of international law. See id. at 305. In applica-
tion to this case, the victims of the gondola accident were from several different
countries; however, because the twenty deaths were caused by the United States
military while stationed in Italy, the third parties who are bringing the civil claims
will be treated as Italian citizens regardless of their nationality (by being able to
settle their claim with the Italian government, who will likely, in turn, be partially
reimbursed by the United States).
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receiving state, not the victim himself, for the victim's claim in
two situations: (1) when damages were caused by a member of
the sending state's military force and were caused during the
performance of official duty; and (2) in other instances that the
sending state's military force is legally responsible. 122
It is clear from this Article that under no circumstances may a
third party from the receiving state or the receiving state itself
assert a civil claim against a military service person for damages
arising from an act or omission while in the performance of offi-
cial duty. Hence, it may be accurately stated that the members
of a sending state's military force are truly immune from civil
prosecution for acts committed while in the performance of offi-
cial duty.123 Conversely, although the sending state is immune
from prosecution by a third party, as well as the receiving state,
the sending state is liable to the receiving state for reimburse-
ment of a settlement of a third party's claim asserted because of
an act or omission caused by the sending state's military force in
the performance of official duty. Thus, the pervasive question
in determining whether the sending state is liable for third party
claims is whether the harm committed was in fact caused by an
act or omission by a sending state's military service person while
in the performance of official duty.
1. Performance of Official Duty
As illustrated in the prior analysis of criminal jurisdiction
under Article VII of NATO SOFA, the definition of performance
of official duty similarly remains undefined in Article VIII, para-
graph 5 covering civil jurisdiction. As expected, because NATO
SOFA provides no precise definition of the phrase, numerous
conflicts arise in attempting to determine what constitutes an
act conducted in the performance of official duty. The United
States has generated a significant amount of legislation on the
subject under both tort law and agency law (agency law appears
to be more applicable to the case at hand). 124
Under agency law, assuming that an agency relationship exists
between the crew-members and the military, the first question is
whether the relationship is that of a "master-servant" relation-
122 See NATO SOFA, supra note 9, at art. VIII, para. 5
123 "[P]rocedure of the substitution is the legal device allowing the compensa-
tion of the victims of a damage while maintaining the legal principle of the im-
munity of jurisdiction of foreign States." L.zAREFr, supra note 20, at 321.
124 See LAZAREr, supra note 20, at 307.
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ship. Because the military clearly has control over the crew-
members' actions, a master-servant relationship may be in-
ferred;1 25 hence, the military is said to be liable for only the
crew-members' actions that are committed while acting in the
scope of employment.1 26 Under the Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 228:
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if,
but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and
space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the
master, and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against an-
other, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master.
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment
if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the au-
thorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose
to serve the master.1 27
Applying the Restatement, it may be argued that the crew-
members were acting within their scope of employment based
on the fact that they were performing a routine flight that was
substantially within the authorized time and space limits for pur-
poses, at least in part, to serve the military. On the other hand,
it may be conversely argued that the crew-members were acting
outside their scope of employment because, although they were
flying a routine training exercise, the crew-members were flying
outside of the authorized time and space limits (by flying too fast
and too low). In summary, it may not be conclusively predicted
whether, under United States law, the crew-members were act-
ing in the scope of their employment (or in the performance of
their official duties). Therefore, the proper conclusion is diffi-
cult to predict when attempting to apply both the law of the
United States and Italy.
Article VIII, paragraph 5 specifically provides that both the
sending and the receiving states are to come to an agreement
on whether the specific act or omission of the military service
person was in fact committed in the performance of official
125 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1984).
126 There are a few exceptions to this rule, found in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 219 (1958). ,
127 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).
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duty.128 But, in the absence of agreement, the Article states that
an arbitrator shall make the final determination. 129
Regarding the case at hand, note that pursuant to the previ-
ous discussion regarding foreign criminal jurisdiction, it is obvi-
ous that the United States would want to claim that the crew-
members were performing in their official duty (i.e. flying the
simulated mission) when the accident occurred so that Italy, as
the receiving state, would be forced under Article VII to waive its
rights to criminal prosecution. Thus, after the United States ar-
gued that the crew-members were performing official duties, it
could not very likely go back and assert the position that the
crew-members were not performing official duties in effort to
waive liability for the civil claims raised by the victims' families.
A legal argument could hypothetically be made by the United
States that the crew-members were not acting in the perform-
ance of official duty when the accident occurred, and hence, the
United States would not be required to reimburse the Italian
government for the settlement of the third party claims. 130 This
argument, however, assuredly will not be asserted because of the
claim previously made by the United States that the crew-mem-
bers were in fact acting in the performance of official duty.
2. Proceeding of Settlement
Assuming it is decided that the crew-members were acting in
the performance of official duty at the time of the accident, and
therefore, that the United States will be substituted for the crew-
members in terms of liability, the procedure for settlement is
explicitly laid out in Article VIII, paragraph 5. In summary, a
consultation between the sending state and the receiving state is
required for reasons of courtesy."' Furthermore, although It-
aly, as the receiving state, is required to conduct an investigation
of the accident, the United States is granted the authority to
conduct its own investigation if it so desires.1 32 From this investi-
128 See NATO SOFA, supra note 9, at art. VIII, para. 5.
129 See id.
130 Although not the subject of this Article, if it were found that the crew-mem-
bers were not acting in the performance of official duty at the time of the acci-
dent, under Article VIII, paragraph 5, the crew-members would, in fact, be civilly
liable to the third-party claimants.
131 See LAzARErr, supra note 20, at 329.
132 See id. The United States, as the sending state, may also give its opinion
upon completion of its own investigation to the Italian Claims Office in Italy, as
the receiving state requests it.
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gation, it is up to the third parties and the receiving state to
reach an agreed settlement, upon which the receiving state will
compensate the third parties.1 3 3 After the third parties have
been compensated, the only remaining legal relationship re-
garding the third-party claims is between the sending state and
the receiving state. Upon the receiving state's compensation of
the third-party claims, the sending state then becomes liable to
the receiving state for reimbursement of a certain percentage of
the dollar amount paid in satisfaction of the claims. In this case,
because the United States was the only sending state involved,
the United States is required to reimburse Italy for seventy-five
percent of the dollar amount paid in satisfaction of the
settlement.1 3 1
III. UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH ITALY
Italy is a significant economic power, as it has the world's fifth
largest economy and is a member of the G-7 economic group. 135
Thus, Italy is an important economic ally to the United States, as
well as an important military ally. One of Italy's greatest contri-
butions to NATO is its continued agreement to allow U.S. mili-
tary troops to be stationed on its territory.13 6  In 1996,
approximately 14,000 U.S. military personnel were permanently
stationed in Italy at eighteen installations and five NATO head-
quarters.1 37 Note, however, that because of the high volume of
U.S. military stationed in Italy, there are presently calls fre-
quently made by Italian journalists and government officials for
examination of current United States-Italy bilateral defense
agreements.1 3 8 Nevertheless, Italy has continued to host the ma-
jority of United States military troops in its country that it has in
the past. From this brief synopsis, one can glean the importance
133 It is clear from Article VIII, paragraph 5, "that the only legal relationship of
the victim of a damage is with the receiving State and cannot be with the wrong-
doer." Id. at 331.
134 See NATO SOFA, supra note 9, at art. VIII, para. 5, sec. (e) (1).
135 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 1995 BACKGROUND NOTES-ITALY 3 (1995).
136 See Major Stephen K. Forjohn, USSSO For Italy-Working On The Set Of La Dolce
Vita, DEc ARMY LAw. 14 (1997).
137 See id. at 17. Note that most U.S. military forces in Italy are stationed at
Aviano Air Base, the location of the alleged offenses committed in the case at
hand. This Air Base is significant because it currently hosts the only United
States F-16 that is permanently stationed in Europe. See id. at n.32.
1-8 See id. at n.31 (citing as an example Maurizio Molinari, Italia e USA, Fine
Della Diplomazia Segreta [Italy and USA, End of Secret Diplomacy], PANORAMA,
Nov. 28, 1996, at 32).
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of the United States maintaining good relations with Italy.
Moreover, it is easy to imagine how the political aspects of a situ-
ation such as this come into play in interpreting NATO SOFA
with the facts at hand.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although foreign jurisdiction issues between two countries
are certainly lessened when a treaty is involved, some problems
inevitably remain. The case at hand demonstrates a few of the
conflicts that persist when one country stations its military
troops in another country. As this Article suggests, jurisdictional
issues are ultimately determined by the position, particularly the
bargaining power, of the sending state and the receiving state.
In the present, the question of whether Italy or the United
States had the primary right to exercise criminal jurisdiction, as
well as the question of whether the United States was liable for
reimbursement to Italy for the third-party civil claims, both turn
on one question: "Were the crew-members acting in the per-
formance of official duty when the crash that killed twenty pas-
sengers occurred?" If the answer to this question is "no," then
Italy should have asserted primary criminal jurisdiction, and the
United States would be released from the necessity of reimburs-
ing Italy for all third-party claims resulting from the accident.
Conversely, if the answer is "yes," then the United States prop-
erly asserted primary criminal jurisdiction, and properly reim-
bursed Italy for all third-party claims arising from the accident.
As previously determined, this question is a question of fact,
and thus, cannot be answered determinatively in this Article.
But, because the United States has already asserted primary
criminal jurisdiction over the incident (and Italy has agreed to
this assertion), we are only left to wonder whether this conclu-
sion was what the drafters of NATO SOFA would have reached?
Arguably, the U.S. drafters would have come to the exact same
conclusion, as it was their position that the United States, as a
military exporter, should never be subject to the jurisdiction of
another country. The drafters from Italy, on the other hand,
would have very likely reached the opposite conclusion based on
their definition of "performance of official duty." They likely
would have concluded that the crew-members were acting
outside of their official duty because they were flying the
Prowler too low and too fast; hence, Italy should have asserted
primary jurisdiction.
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It cannot be denied that the United States has historically
used its position as a super-power in order to obtain the advan-
tage of maintaining jurisdiction over its military troops that are
stationed in foreign countries. The United States has done this
in several different ways, including exerting its jurisdiction prin-
ciple (law of the flag) over other countries when those countries
are in a weak bargaining position, using political situations to its
advantage (as seen in World War I & II), and creating new laws
or expanding existing laws (e.g. Article 134 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice) in an effort to maintain a proper juris-
diction claim over all crimes that could possibly be committed
by its military personnel while stationed in a foreign country.
The tactics used by the United States may be viewed in two ways.
On one hand, the United States may be viewed as a bully, who
thinks that it does not have to play by the rules, even if the rules
are distinctly put forth in a treaty, and will ultimately get its way.
On the other hand, the United States may be viewed as a protec-
tor: a protector of the world, as well as a protector of its own
citizens. Hence, it is necessary for the United States, as the larg-
est military exporter in the world, to exercise tactics such as
those listed above so that it may continue to contribute its mili-
tary services in same way it has in the past.
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